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I. INTRODUCTION
There can be no peace without justice, no justice without
law, and no meaningful law without a court to decide what
is just and lawful under any given circumstance. The
process of codification, adjudication and enforcement is as
vital to a tranquil international community as it is to any
independent national state.
-Benjamin B. Ferencz'"
The success of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes
Tribunals will determine the future of international criminal law. Whether
the Tribunals are able to command the attention and respect of the world
remains to be seen.
The situation in the former Yugoslavia has deteriorated to the point
where it resembles Nazi-era Europe. The media has bombarded our living
rooms with reports of "ethnic cleansing,"' mass graves, torture, and
reports of concentration camps virtually identical to those of World War
I1. As we saw the destruction, the initial public outrage was strong.
However, as with most crises, the international community successfully
avoided taking affirmative action for three years while the atrocities
continued unhindered. When the international community finally took
** BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARDS
WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 30, 31 (1980).
1. The idiom "ethnic cleansing" has been often used to analogize the Serbian's weapon of
mass rape. Feryal Gharahi related one story to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe in February of 1993. In Milivania, Serbian forces converted the local gymnasium to a
rape camp. There, the women were repeatedly gang-raped in order to assure impregnation, thus
ridding Bosnia of all non-Serbs. If the women resisted, their throats were slit. After
impregnation, the women were kept in the camps until it was too late to terminate the pregnancy.
War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Hearings Before the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1993) (testimony of Feryal Gharani)
[hereinafter Security In Europe]; see generally Danise Aydelott, Comment, Mass Rape During
War: Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists Under International Law, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 585, 596
(1993). This ethnic cleansing policy, part of the Serbian war plan, did not end there. While
women were in the rape camps, men were sent to concentration camps. Several men died after
being castrated in the attempt to end all non-Serbian blood-lines. Catherine Toups, Atrocity
Probes Home in on Serbia; U.N. Requests Case For War Crime Trial, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1994, at A11.
2. Steve Coil, War Crimes and Punishment, WASH. POST MAG., Sept. 25, 1994, at 25
(describing the similarities between Bosnia and Nazi Germany as chilling: ethnic hatred, the old
European setting, and specific acts of barbarity are indicative of the Nazi-era overtones).
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action, via the International Tribunal, the next human tragedy was already
underway.
The slaughter of the Tutsi minority orchestrated by the Hutus in
Rwanda occurred as the Yugoslavian Tribunal was gaining momentum.
The Tutsi genocide in Rwanda has been faster than any other episode in
the last fifty years.3 In the first three months of 1994, one million Tutsis
were slaughtered, as compared to Bosnia where 200,000 were killed over
a period of two years.! Hutu militias have been savage and barbaric in
their pursuit of the Tutsi minority.5
As evidence of these atrocities mounts, there exists a desire to
punish those responsible. However, this seemingly logical urge is
overshadowed by the practicalities of prosecuting criminals across borders.
This comment contends that the anticipated Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal
has been ill-conceived. With zeal that stems from the promulgation of
honor, morality, and good intentions, various segments of the international
community have laid the foundations for justice, while overlooking its
virtual impossibility in this situation.
Part I will list a brief chronology of the War Crimes Tribunal, the
United Nations' response to the Rwandan nightmare. Next, the Tribunal's
basis for authority will be examined. This is followed by an analysis of
the potential problems under the Tribunal's current structure.
Jurisdictionally, many argue that the tribunal will conflict with state
sovereignty, as well as interfere with the protection of individual liberties.'
Additionally, this section will discuss the administrative difficulties in
gathering evidence8 and procurring extradition.9
3. Tom Masland, Will It Be Peace or Punishment? NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1994, at 37.
4. Id.
5. Lindsey Hilsum, Settling Scores, AFR. REP., May-June, 1994, at 14 (Rwanda's radio
broadcasts prior to the massacres defining the Tutsis as "cockroaches" which need to be
exterminated).
6. Prior to the creation of the Tribunal, the Ambassadors representing Turkey, Denmark,
Austria, and the Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Community all testified
to the importance of forming an international tribunal, and urged the United States to support it.
European Perspective on Bosnian Conflict: Hearing Before the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 8, 16, 20 (1993) [hereinafter European
Perspective].
7. Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal,
18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77, 91 (1994).
8. Francoise J. Hampson, War Crimes Fact-Finding in the Former Yugoslavia, 1 INT'L LAW
& ARMED CONFLICT COMMENTARY, 28, 29 (1994). Often there is a degree of political control
over the fact-finding activities of these tribunals.
9. Jeri Laber & Ivana Nizich, The War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Problems
and Prospects, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 12 (1994). The difficulty of extradition of a person
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Part II affirms the Rwandans' duty to prosecute these human rights
violations. The model used by other emerging democracies for
punishment is applied to the Rwandan situation. Ultimately, this model's
utility is superseded by the need for an International Criminal Court.
Finally, Part III will show that the Tribunal's failures demonstrate
the need for a permanent International Criminal Court. Various proposals
for a permanent court have been recommended, but none have been
adopted due to problems that exist in each model. Nevertheless, this
comment concludes that the creation of a permanent criminal court, which
enforces a permanent code of crimes, would benefit the international
community overall. More specifically, an established court potentially
could have saved countless Rwandan lives.
II. THE WESTERN IMPOSITION
A. Historical Summary
Without mechanisms for individual nations to control international
crime, the need for a tribunal to prosecute serious violations of
humanitarian law has emerged in various areas of the world.'" In response
to the Yugoslavian crisis, the United Nations has created the "International
Tribunal for the sole purpose of Prosecuting Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Former Yugoslavia."" Since the organization of the
Yugoslavian Tribunal, Richard Goldstone, the chief prosecutor for the
Tribunal, has sought concurrent jurisdiction for the prosecution of crimes
committed in Rwanda.' 2
On June 28, 1994, the Commission on Human Rights of the
United Nations reported on the gravity of the Rwandan situation.' 3 Two
days later, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 935
requesting the establishment of. an impartial Commission of Experts to
further examine and analyze evidence of grave violations of humanitarian
law in Rwanda. 4 By the end of July, the Secretary-General issued a report
indicted for war crimes is well recognized. In fact, sanctions against parties who refuse to cooperate
with the tribunal have been proposed.
10. Thomas R. Kleinberger, Note, The Iraqi Conflict: An Assessment of Possible War Crimes
and the Call for Adoption of an International Criminal Code and Permanent International Criminal
Tribunal, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 69, 70 (1993).
11. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
12. John Shattuck, War Crimes First, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1994, at A19.
13. See U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., at 5-8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/' (1994) [hereinafter
Escor], for a detailed accounting of the Hutu militia slaughter of the Tutsi minority.
14. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3400th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994).
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stressing that the Commission of Experts was actively gathering and
documenting evidence of these violations, especially acts of genocide, in
the hopes of pursuing prosecution. 5
The Commission's preliminary report 6 suggested either the
creation of a new international criminal tribunal 7 or that the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia be expanded
to cover Rwandan crimes. 8 This suggestion was heeded, but without the
support of Rwanda, whose government voted against the resolution.'
On November 8, 1994, the Security Council established the
International Tribunal for Rwanda through Resolution 955.1' With
Rwanda as the sole dissenting vote, the Security Council established an
independent tribunal whose sole objective is to "prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for
such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states .... ",1
The final vote on the establishment of the tribunal had thirteen votes in
favor, one vote against the tribunal from Rwanda and an abstention from
China." Although Rwanda initially urged the United Nations to take
action against the Hutus who had organized this genocide, they had several
reasons for rejecting the United Nations' plan. First, the tribunal only has
jurisdiction over crimes committed after January 1, 1994.23 Secondly, the
15. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Commission of Experts
Pursuant to Paragraph I of Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) of I July 1994, 49th Sess., at 2-
3, U.N. Doc. S/1994/879 (1994).
16. Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance
with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), Commission of Experts on Rwanda, 49th Sess., Annex
to the Letter, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994).
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id. at 32.
19. Julia Preston, Tribunal Set on Rwandan War Crimes; Kigali Votes No on U.N.
Resolution, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1994, at A44.
20. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
21. Id.
22. Preston, supra note 19, at A44. But cf U.N. Genocide Tribunal Wins Rwanda's Support,
BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 10, 1994, at A22. (Rwanda's U.N. Ambassador Manzi Bakurmuta stated
that while Rwanda is not in complete agreement with the United Nations' Tribunal, they will
nonetheless cooperate with all United Nations efforts.)
23. Raymond Bonner, Top Rwandan Criticizes U.S. Envoy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1994, at
All (noting that the crimes occurred long before January 1, 1994, therefore many of the worst
perpetrators will be overlooked with the proposed time limitation). See William Schabas, Atrocities
and the Law, CANADIAN LAW., Aug./Sept. 1993, at 33-36. The dispute in Rwanda is not new.
Rwanda has been a battlefield for two major ethnic groups, the Tutsi's and Hutu's for centuries. Id.
at 34. In January of 1993, a Canadian-based organization, International Centre for Human Rights
and Democratic Development, sent a 10-member fact-finding commission to Rwanda. Id. This
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government strongly opposed the United Nation's Tribunal because the
procedural rules do not include the death penalty.24 To a lesser degree, the
Rwandan government is also dissatisfied with the slow pace of the United
Nations bureaucratic method 5 and the Tribunal's decisions not to use
Rwandan judges26 nor to hold the trials in Rwanda. 7
B. The Tribunal's Authority?
Noting the Rwandan opposition to the Tribunal, it is important to
examine the justification for the United Nations' authority to act in this
situation. Two ground-breaking determinations were made. First,
pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 8 the United
Nations Security Council defined the humanitarian violations in Rwanda as
a threat to international peace.29 Together Articles 39 and 41 of the
Charter provide the Security Council with the power to decide which
enforcement measures to take to maintain international peace.3" Using this
discretion, the Security Council concluded the tribunal was the appropriate
response to the Rwandan threat.3'
group was one of many over the years who experienced the genocide and crimes against humanity.
Because there has been documentation of the horror in Rwanda over the past several years, the Tutsi
government had lobbied unsuccessfully to extend the Tribunal's jurisdiction to the time prior to
January, 1994.
24. Preston, supra note 19, at A44. Rwanda has repeatedly complained about the double
standard which it sees developing. The more minor criminals in the Rwandan conflict will be
prosecuted under Rwandan law; therefore, they will be subject to the death penalty. However,
the major offenders will be subjected to the punishment of the Tribunal. Thus, those guilty of
planning and organizing this mass genocide will be condemned only to life sentences.
25. Keith B. Richburg & Stephen L. Buckley, Rwandan Premier Bitter Over Delay of U.N.
Crimes Trials, Foreign Aid, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1994, at A30. Senior officials within the
Rwandan government are becoming increasingly impatient. The Rwandan Patriotic Front has
already surrendered enough documents to bring some cases to trial. Unless the United Nations acts
quickly, many leaders are promising to create their own courts to try various Hutu leaders.
26. Toups, supra note 1.
27. Bonner, supra note 23. Criminals are actually benefitted by Rwandan prosecution. If the
criminals are imprisoned in Europe, their standard of living would be significantly higher than if
they were in Rwanda. Id. Innocent people would be willing to live in European prisons rather than
in Rwanda. Id.
28. Chapter 7 is titled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
andActs ofAggression." U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
29. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 2.
30. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41.
31. Id. See Monroe Leigh, et al., Report on the International Tribunal to Adjudicate War
Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC. 10 (1993) [hereinafter A.B.A.
Report]. The ABA report noted that although Article 41 of the United Nations Charter does not
specify a Tribunal as one of the measures to deal with a threat to international peace, it is certainly
within their discretion to use this means.
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The conflict in Rwanda has both internal and international
elements. Although a civil conflict originally, the flight of the Rwandans
into Zaire and other neighboring countries has caused the conflict to
escalate beyond Rwanda's borders. Thus, able to define this human
tragedy as international, the Security Council is free to apply the entirety
of the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and Protocol I, which
provides remedies only to international conflicts.32 The importance of this
decision must not be underestimated. The ethnic tensions in Rwanda have
manifested themselves primarily in the form of an internal civil conflict, as
opposed to Yugoslavia which has developed into an international civil
war.33 The United Nations Security Council has made a monumental leap
reshaping future international law by defining Rwandan violations of
humanitarian law as factors in determining a threat to international peace. 4
Secondly, if the United Nations had deemed the Rwandan conflict
to be internal or civil, Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions would apply,
but generally would not give rise to universal criminal jurisdiction.35
Recently, there has been a trend toward the international criminalization of
common Article 3 offenses of the Geneva Conventions during non-
international armed conflicts.' For example, the 1991 Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind expressly recognizes
that penal sanctions may reach the non-international armed conflicts
contemplated by Article 3.37 However, the Draft Code has not yet been
adopted, and it is still a matter of debate whether common Article 3
violations give rise to individual penal responsibility.38 Therefore, the
32. Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 80 (1994).
33. Id. Cf. Winston P. Nagan, Yugoslavia: A Case Study of International Consequences of
Independence Movements, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 205, 218-19 (1993) [hereinafter Case Study].
In Yugoslavia, even after the United Nations Commission of Experts had recognized the crisis was
of an international character, reasonable minds differed on the nature of the conflict. Id. at 218.
Many Slavs such as Nebojsa Vujovic, of the United States Embassy of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, claimed this was a religious, ethnic, and civil war. Id. This distinction between
international and civil conflicts was essential to determining what body of law to apply to these
criminals and was the subject of much debate. Id.
34. Meron, supra note 32, at 79-80.
35. Id. at 80.
36. Id. at 82.
37. Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Law to Events in the Former
Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499, 512 (1994).
38. Meron, supra note 31, at 82. Although common Article 3 does not follow the letter of
the Hague Regulations or the Geneva Conventions, common Article 3 is part of the body of law
which is identified as humanitarian law. Therefore, it is arguably covered under statute 3 of the
Tribunal's statute.
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Security Council's decision to define these conflicts as international was a
deliberate attempt to expand the likelihood for an international response to
non-international violations of humanitarian law in order to avoid any
questions of international jurisdiction over the Rwandan criminals. 3
Thus, through the creation of the Rwandan Tribunal, the United
Nations has established two precedents of law. First, it defined violations
of humanitarian law in a civil, ethnic conflict as threats to international
peace, thus granting the Tribunal the ability to prosecute those violations.
Second, the United Nations established the possibility of the international
criminalization of violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions in non-international armed conflicts. Unfortunately, unless
the Tribunal is able to overcome the vast number of obstacles which
currently impede its success, these precedents may be quickly forgotten.
C. Problems of the Tribunal
1. First Problem: A Lack of Precedent
In the absence of an established international criminal court, or
even an international criminal code, the international community has
accorded little credence to the proposed prosecutions. ' Referring to both
Nuremberg and the Far East Trials for guidance, the United Nations has
attempted to fashion an international tribunal in their likeness."' However,
neither Nuremberg nor the Far East Tribunal provide the proper
precedent. Nuremberg itself was ultimately a facade of authority
stemming from the victor's right to justice42 and in reality lacked the
necessary precedent to withstand serious scrutiny. Even assuming that the
deficiencies of the World War II tribunals could be resolved, the situations
39. Id. at 81.
40. Security In Europe, supra note 1, at 15. At the CSCE hearings on war crimes in
February of 1993, Representative Frank McCloskey stated that the top echelon of military leaders
who have been accused of committing war crimes, had already been assured amnesty. Id. He
credited "high ranking military sources in Croatia and our own State Department" as relaying that
information. Id. Belief in the integrity of the Tribunal is not high.
41. See Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 833, 834, 836 (1990). Despite Nuremberg's shortcomings, it is generally considered a
landmark in international law. See generally Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty Five Years
Later, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991) (justifying the legitimacy of the trials with a complete legal and
moral arguments).
42. Blakesley, supra note 7, at 80. The victor's justice is often criticized for making biased
decisions. Id. But see Elizabeth Pearl, Punishing Balkan War Criminals: Could the End of
Yugoslavia Provide an End to Victors'Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1373, 1399 (1993) (arguing
that prosecution by the victors is standard because only the victors can project the moral superiority
required for a war crime tribunal).
[Vol. I
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vary too dramatically for Nuremberg to be the proper legal basis for
today's tribunal.
Initially legal experts waivered in classifying Nuremberg as legal
precedent for the present Tribunals, a clear sign of its lacking authority. '
First, the timing is different. Unlike Nuremberg, the United Nations has
decided not to wait until the end of the conflict before attempting to
prosecute." Indeed, the victors of the conflict may be indicted while the
conflict rages."5 This will not only complicate the outcome of the war, but
also the stability of the nation after the conflict.'
Secondly, the Yugoslavian and Rwandan situations are
fundamentally different from that of Nazi Germany or Japan. The
Germans proudly kept meticulous records of their crimes."' After the
war, each captured Nazi soldier and liberated building provided the
evidence necessary to complete the trials. 8 In Yugoslavia, soldiers move
constantly between units 9 and there are no simple means to gather
evidence.50 In Rwanda, the criminals have long since fled.5' There is a
tremendous degree of variance between the circumstances of the two
situations.
Nuremberg and Tokyo are of poor precedential value not only
because of the differences between World War II and today's situations,
but also because Nuremberg and Tokyo were preceded by several failures.
The Nuremberg Trials took place in the wake of a failed attempt to convict
German officials of war crimes following World War I.11 International law
43. Coil, supra note 2, at 23. Lawrence Eagleburger, former Acting Secretary of State,
recalled that State Department attorneys were constantly admonishing him to be cautious about
Bosnia. Id. "The lawyers would say, as Eagleburger remembers, 'For God's sake, don't do it. We
don't have the right legal background. Nuremberg isn't quite the right thing, as legal precedent."'
Id. (The situation in Rwanda and Yugoslavia is easily distinguishable from that following World
War II.)
44. Pearl, supra note 42, at 1402.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1413.
47. Case Study, supra note 33, at 21.
48. Coil, supra note 2, at 14. The surrender of the German buildings which housed the
records of their plan of destruction was direct evidence of the atrocities committed. In many
instances, the Germans had authored the evidence which was subsequently used against them.
49. Case Study, supra note 33, at 21.
50. Coil, supra note 2, at 14.
51. Dilip Ganguly, Tanzania Sees More Refugees; Zaire Tells Them To Go Home, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1994, at A14.
52. BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARDS
WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 30-33 (1980). The Allied powers
were forced to compromise Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles which conceded that the
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never addressed issues such as a nation's treatment of its citizens prior to
World War L.3 Previously, human abuse was only prosecutable in the
state in which the abuse took place. Furthermore, states themselves were
rarely reviewed.' Thus, the Allies quest for retribution, rather than legal
precedent, provided the basis for the Nuremberg Trials.
Furthermore, both the Nuremberg, and especially the Tokyo trials,
have been sternly criticized for violations of due process, judicial bias, and
unconventional procedural mechanisms." For example, the defendants at
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials were often found guilty of committing
"crimes against the peace" and "crimes against humanity." However,
these crimes were not part of international law prior to the trials.' Thus,
the Nuremberg trial's use of ex post facto laws violated the defendant's
due process. 7
Finally, at Nuremberg and Tokyo only the victorious nations took
part in assigning the punishments. Neither Germany nor Japan5f were
permitted to participate in the activities of the Tribunals. 9 The potential
for abuse is obvious where the victor is trying the defeated enemy.'
Citing this potential, the United Nations has chosen not to allow Rwandan
judges on the Tribunal.' Thus the United Nations' Tribunal will have the
benefit of being adjudicated by impartial parties, and the decision will not
be plagued by accusations of bias. However, there remains the problem of
the hypocrisy associated with the Nuremberg Trials.
Kaiser would be charged with merely a political crime, thereby indirectly preserving his
immunity. Id. at 30. In return, the rest of the accused were to be brought before military
tribunals. Id. However, the Germans refused to recognize the provisions of the Treaty which
involved foreign adjudication, and the war crimes trials were conducted in Leipzig after
continuous German opposition to the Versailles mandates. Id. at 32. Not surprisingly, the
German courts exonerated or minimized the defendants' liabilities, and reduced the number of
cases from over 900 to less than 50, with only a handful being convicted. d. at 33.
53. Diane F. Ortenlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2555 (1991).
54. Id.
55. Michael P. Scharf, The Jury Is Still Out on the Need for an International Criminal Court,
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 135, 138 (1991).
56. Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 13.
57. Id.
58. Ann M. Prevost, Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki
Yamashita, 14 HUM. RTs. Q. 304, 328 (1992). Not only has the Yamashita case been characterized
as a case of victors' justice but also of racial prejudice. The command responsibility theory
employed against Yamashita was not applied at Nuremberg against the Germans. Id. at 305.
59. Scharf, supra note 55, at 138.
60. Pearl, supra note 42, at 1399.
61. Toups, supra note 1, at All.
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Following World War II, allied actions such as the bombings of
Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki went unreviewed.Y If the
victor's actions are dismissed, then justice is being distributed arbitrarily.63
To avoid this hypocrisy, every attempt must be made to prosecute all
violations of humanitarian law in this conflict. The situation in Rwanda is
complicated further because many organizations, such as Amnesty
International," and even the United Nations, are beginning to collect
evidence of the reprisal killings by the Tutsis against the Hutus. 6 In fact,
the conditions in which the Hutu prisoners are currently being detained
have been likened to concentration camps themselves, and possibly are in
violation of humanitarian laws.' To protect the credibility of the Tribunal,
individuals on both sides of the conflict must be prosecuted.67
The United Nations must remember that "the law must apply to
leaders of every nation."" Furthermore, the importance of universal
enforcement cannot be underestimated. In order to avoid the taint of
hypocrisy associated with Nuremberg and Tokyo, justice must not be
distributed arbitrarily.' In other words, the law must be enforced agaist
the Rwanda Patriotic Front as well as the Hutu extremists, and Bosnians as
well as Serbians." Thus, the initial hurdle for the Tribunal will be to
overcome any questions of propriety to which it is subjected by virtue of
its basis in Nuremberg.
62. Blakesley, supra note 7, at 80.
63. Id.
64. Bonner, supra note 23, at All.
65. Keith B. Richburg, New Accusations of Rwandan Reprisals, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Sept. 26, 1994, at A2.
66. Robert Press, In Rwanda's 'Slave Ship' Prisons, Life Is Grim for Suspected Killers,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1994 at 1. (Currently 15,000 to 20,000 Hutu prisoners,
including children, are packed into tightly cramped prisons.)
67. General Kagame has assured the Tribunal authorities that it will assist the Tribunal in the
prosecution of Rwandan Patriotic Front soldiers accused of breaking humanitarian laws. Bonner,
supra note 23.
68. TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 641 (1992). Telford
Taylor, who took part in the Nuremberg prosecutions, is of the opinion that international criminal
law will have no justification until the victorious nations' behavior is examined as well. Unlike
what the proponents of victor's justice would argue, winning the battle does not place the
conqueror above reproach.
69. Blakesley, supra note 7, at 80.
70. Robert F. Drinan, Is a Permanent Nuremberg on the Horizon?, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 103, 107 (1994).
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2. Second Problem: Jurisdictional Difficulties
a. State Sovereignty
Article 8 of the Rwandan Tribunal statute establishes the
concurrent jurisdiction of the International Tribunal with the national
courts in Rwanda.7' However, this is limited by Article 8(2) which gives
the Tribunal primacy over the national courts. These provisions, which
are corollaries to Articles 9 and 10 of the Yugoslavian Tribunal Statute,
have been questioned for their infringement of national sovereignty.' In
response, countries such as the United States have asked the United
Nations and the Security Council to recognize the domestic action needed
before complying with the International Tribunal, and to allow extra time
before compliance. 3
In Rwanda, the primacy of this Tribunal may cause conflict with
the domestic courts anxious to prosecute all the culprits. Furthermore, the
government already objects to the Tribunal's limited jurisdiction of 1994,
and its prohibition of the death penalty." The Western Tribunal has not
been openly accepted by the Rwandans, and the ultimate control resting
with the Tribunal will not ease the strain between the competing interests.
b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Article 1 of the statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda
gives the tribunal jurisdiction over "serious violations of international
humanitarian law."75 These serious violations are described in Article 2 as
genocide,76 in Article 3 as crimes against humanity," and in Article 4 as
violations of common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol
11.78 While the subject matter is relatively straight-forward, defendants still
may be able to challenge this jurisdiction.
71. Despite UN Tribunal, Rwanda Plans To Try Suspects for War Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
10, 1994, at A6. Ambassador Manzi Bakuramuta estimated the number of Rwandans to be
prosecuted in national courts at 30,000.
72. Blakesley, supra note 7, at 79.
73. Case Study, supra note 33, at 165. The United States, for example, has several due
process procedures which must be implemented before turning a person over to the Tribunal. Id.
There remains a significant concern on the part of several nations that national laws will be ceded to
international laws. Id.
74. Bonner, supra note 23, at A 1.
75. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 1.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 5.
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The Statute for the Rwandan Tribunal does not preclude
defendants from challenging the Tribunal's authority. 9 Defendants may
successfully argue that they were involved in a civil war, and thus are not
subject to the Geneva or Hague Conventions.' The Tribunal possesses the
authority to judge these potential challenges of jurisdiction.' How the
judges may rule remains to be determined, but the potential for problems
exists.
c. Limited Temporal Jurisdiction
Article 7 of the Rwandan Statute limits temporal jurisdiction to
crimes committed between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.5
This is problematic because limiting the jurisdiction could protect those
who planned the genocide. 3  The Rwandan national courts may
successfully prosecute those who carried out the genocide. However, the
Tribunal's time limit does not reach those who gave the orders which
would cause the Tribunal to lose credibility.
3. Administrative Problems
a. Gathering Evidence
The Commission of Experts for Rwanda and the Special
Rapporteur for Rwanda have found significant violations of human rights.?
Still, the thorough process of gathering evidence for trial will be long and
arduous.85 According to Article 14 of the Rwandan Tribunal Statute, the
rules governing evidence and procedure are the same as those for the
Yugoslavian Tribunal.'
79. Meron, supra note 32, at 82.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 6.
83. Bonner, supra note 23.
84. Escor, supra note 13, at 11-13.
85. Hampson, supra note 8, at 29. The crimes fact-finding will be especially complicated
because of the co-mingling of war-crimes fact-finding and humanitarian fact-finding. There has been
a great deal of political control over some of the formal investigations. Id. There is a strong
likelihood that some of the information is likely to remain within foreign ministries. Id. It is even
possible that the limited resources of the Tribunal may prevent a full investigation. Id. at 30.
Although the non-governmental organizations such as Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International are
depended upon by the international community, problems may exist with admitting their information
into any kind of formal evidence. Id. at 28. The same principle can be extended to the Rwandan
crisis.
86. International Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. IT/32
(1994).
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Lacking any enforcement mechanisms, the collection of evidence
in Yugoslavia has been blocked several times by Serbian forces.87 If the
Serbs continue to be uncooperative, it may be impossible to obtain
sufficient evidence to indict or prosecute certain suspects." This may
foreshadow a similar problem in Rwanda. Unless the Tribunal is able to
convince the Hum forces to cooperate, the prosecutors may not be able to
gather enough evidence for prosecution. 89
b. Extradition
Most of the criminals in Rwanda have fled the country. The
Tribunal currently lacks an enforcement mechanism to extradite persons to
the Hague Tribunal.' Rule 56 of Evidence and Procedure for the
Tribunal9' requires all states to comply with an extradition order, but lacks
a corresponding mechanism to enforce the rule.' Furthermore, the
tribunal does not allow for trials in abstentia. 93 Accordingly, sanctions
have been suggested as the method through which states should be forced
to comply. ' However, as of yet, no sanctions have been imposed to bring
about compliance."
Unfortunately, extradition problems for the Yugoslavian Tribunal
have already developed. Currently, the only two cases upon which the
87. Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 12.
88. Id.
89. Andrew Purvis, Collusion with Killers, TIME, Nov. 7, 1994, at 52. The massacres in
Rwanda have been more of a random nature. Although evidence of a planned genocide exists, the
attacks have not been planned in an attempt to gather more territory. Often the attacks are retaliatory
murders, committed in the night. Id. When morning light comes, entire families are found slain in
the middle of the camps. Id. There has not been a highly systematic level of record-keeping;
therefore, collecting evidence will already be complicated.
90. Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 12.
91. International Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 86, at 30. Rule 56
states that "[t]he state to which a warrant of arrest is transmitted shall act promptly and with all
due diligence to ensure proper and effective execution thereof in accordance with Article 29 of
the statute."
92. Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 12.
93. Tribunal Charges Camp Commander, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 8, 1994,
at A10.
94. Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 12.
95. But see U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1994). The
United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, argued that sanctions may in
fact be unnecessary. Because those extradited will be outlaws in their home nations, that itself is a
significant punishment. Id. For the rest of their lives, their mobility will be hampered because
travel would increase the risk of discovery. Id. Albright predicts that this will be sufficient
deterrent to ignoring extradition orders. Id.
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United Nations Tribunal has taken action have both been hampered by
extradition problems with Germany and the Serbian held portion of
Bosnia.' In an attempt to prevent the same problem from occurring,
Rwanda itself has asked Belgium to extradite about ten Rwandans
suspected of orchestrating the genocide earlier this year.' Provided
Belgium does not forestall extradition of the Rwandan criminals for lack of
an extradition agreement with the Tribunal, these ten may be brought
before the Tribunal shortly.
c. Superior Orders
The Tribunal has not recognized the defense of superior orders.98
This omission is present in the Yugoslavian Tribunal, and has been
criticized for excluding good faith situations where the actor did not know
the deed was wrong." Whether the Court will allow such a defense should
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, rather than precluding
its use completely." In both Rwanda and Yugoslavia, several defendants
may be able to prove that they did know their actions were wrong.
Therefore, the superior orders argument may provide these defendants
with a viable defense resulting in a lighter sentence.
4. The Last Problem: Peace Over Punishment
Lastly, the success of this Tribunal is important not only for its
goals of deterrence and punishment, but also for its effect on the future of
international criminal law.10' An unsuccessful tribunal may have a long-
96. Toups, supra note 1. Dusan Tadic, a Bosnian Serb held by Germany since February,
may not be turned over to the Tribunal. Extradition treaties exist between countries, but not between
the countries and international organizations. Id. Tribunal Charges Camp Commander, supra note
93. Dragan Nikolic has been formally indicted by the Tribunal, but will not be handed over by the
Bosnian Serbs with whom he is currently hiding. The Tribunal has no power to order his
extradition. Id.
97. Exiled Dictator on Genocide Charges, GLASGOW HERALD, Nov. 14, 1994, at 7.
98. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 6. Statute Article 6(4) - Individual Criminal
Responsibility states: "The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a
Government [sic] or a superior shall not relieve his or her criminal responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that
justice so requires."
99. A.B.A. Report, supra note 30, at 38.
100. Id. at 40.
101. Meron, supra note 32, at 78. Scholars in the sphere of international criminal law such
as Theodor Meron hope that the Tribunal's creation "gives a new lease on life to that part of
international criminal law which applies to violations of humanitarian law."
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term deleterious effect on the development of international criminal law. °
If the use of tribunals is threatened but never successfully implemented,
the credibility of future attempts at an international criminal court could be
jeopardized. °3 The United Nations officially established that the first and
foremost goals of the Tribunal are "deterence, justice, and peace."'
However, several times during the peace negotiations the parties have
suggested foregoing the Tribunals for Rwanda, and especially
Yugoslavia,"°s in the interest of a peace settlement."° Gary Bass noted that
the reason the Tribunal is lacking in strength in that it has not been
sufficiently extricated from the peace process: "when a Balkan peace
settlement is on the table, the war crimes tribunal tends to be shunted
102. Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the 1990s, 10
DICK. J. INT'L L. 223, 243 (1992).
103. Id.
104. See A "Terrible War" Rages On, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1994, at 65.
105. European Perspective, supra note 6, at 25. The situation is particularly precarious in the
former Yugoslavia where the military leaders participating in the peace negotiations are also some of
the Tribunal's future indictees. Representative Steny Hoyer, acting Co-Chairman of the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, has voiced concerns over the appointment of Milosevic to
the peace negotiations. Id. After having been formally termed a war criminal by the United States
government, Milosevic now is in a position to decide whether the Tribunal will be established. Id.
Congressman Hoyer is not confidant that Milosevic will act impartially. Id.
See also Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability In Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
500, 501 (1994). Professor D'Amato alleges that currently these military leaders are being offered
amnesty in exchange for peace in the former Yugoslavia. Id. In essence, the threat of a Tribunal is
being used as a "bargaining chip" over the peace negotiators to come to a quicker resolution. Id. at
504. In return, the leaders are promised that the Tribunal will never happen. Id.
Although Professor D'Amato cites no authority for his allegations, it is not totally
incredible. It is highly unlikely that those Yugoslavian leaders are going to reach a peace settlement
soon, since in doing so they would be availing themselves to prosecutions. It is plausible that the
United Nations officials would offer the criminals a deal in the interest of bringing peace to the area
more quickly. Of course, the obvious secrecy of this bargaining makes proving it a virtual
impossibility, but it remains an interesting factor to consider in the weighing of the Tribunal's future.
106. Linda Maguire, An Interview with Telford Taylor, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 1, 2
(1994). Telford Taylor, a prosecutor at Nuremberg, tells his views of the international tribunal:
TIr: The Serbs have gone a long way toward getting what they want and they are not going to
want to pull back and make things better for the Bosnians, so the war could drag on and make things
that much worse. But at the moment, both sides seem to be endeavoring to find some solutions to
these problems.
LM: So in the interest of a lasting political settlement, the idea of the former Yugoslavian
Tribunal might be scuttled altogether, just so the parties can move on?
T-l: I should think that it would be very difficult to come to a conclusion with the Serbs
without some agreement between the parties allowing for a general amnesty, or some other solution
that the Serbs would be willing to swallow.
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aside; Britain and other European Community countries worry that threats
of prosecution might derail a settlement." 7
The same is true of Rwanda. Experts such as Frank Cringler, a
former United States Ambassador to Rwanda, have even warned against
using the tribunal at all.'01 Cringler claims that reuniting this society is
more important than singling out one group. He asserts it may be
necessary to welcome war criminals back, or at least defer prosecution, to
promote the end of hostilities.'" When dealing with ethnic conflicts, there
is a strong likelihood that one group could create further animosity,
thereby preventing reconciliation."' As in Yugoslavia, there is a strong
contingent in Rwanda that wishes to sacrifice justice in order to re-
establish peace.
Bringing an end to the hostilities in these countries is laudable.
However, hopes of deterring future atrocities in Rwanda can only occur if
justice is served quickly. Even now with the Tribunal looming in the near
future, there is no evidence of restraint by the Rwandan criminals."' If the
Tribunal chooses to replace punishment with a settlement of hostilities, the
set-back to international criminal law could be enormous.
The preceding criticisms of the Tribunal are by no means an
exhaustive list. Only a few of the most obviously troublesome have been
mentioned in order to illustrate the immense problems which face the
current Tribunal structure.
5. The Outlook for the Tribunal
To a certain degree it is true that a successful tribunal would
increase the legitimacy of international criminal law."I Increased stability
of international law would probably accompany this revitalization." 3  In
fact, the mere formation of the Tribunal is indicative of the international
107. Gary J. Bass, Courting Disaster: The U.N. Goes Soft on Bosnia. Again., NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1993, at 12.
108. Masland, supra note 3, at 37.
109. Id. at 37.
110. Id.
111. Purvis, supra note 89, at 52. Hutu militias, who fled following the Tutsi coup this
summer, are now terrorizing the refugee camps established throughout neighboring Zaire. They
are robbing the supplies and food which arrive daily, after being donated by the international
community. Id. The supplies are then sold to raise money to buy weapons and munitions in an
elaborate effort to retake Rwanda from the Patriotic Front. Id. These acts themselves are also
criminal: the potential starvation of millions of refugees will not be taken lightly by the
Tribunal.
112. Kleinberger, supra note 10, at 106.
113. Id.
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community's desire to end the blatant violations of humanitarian law in
these situations."14 However, the sincerity of the community's intentions is
not in question; the ability to do something about it is. The immensity of
the problems facing the, Tribunal make success unlikely. This is
unfortunate not only for the international community, but more
importantly, for the Yugoslavian and Rwandan victims. Thus an
alternative forum may provide the proper method for adjudication.
III. ALTERNATIVE FORUMS
A. The State's Duty To Prosecute Prior Human Rights Violations
International criminal law does require states to punish certain
human rights abuses." ' Some international treaties explicitly provide for
this duty." 6 Most treaties, such as the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights, do not expressly mention a duty to punish when these
114. See Meron, supra note 32, at 78. Theodor Meron has stated that the creation of the
Yugoslavian Tribunal has already made seven institutional and normative improvements to
international law. First, by defining the Yugoslavian crisis as a threat to international peace, the
United Nations has created a strong precedent that the violation of humanitarian laws is a threat
to peace. Id. at 79. Second, the Tribunal's statute also legitimizes various areas of humanitarian
law as customary law. Id. Next, the tribunal successfully treated the Yugoslavian crisis as an
international arms conflict, thus securing the application of the entirety of international
humanitarian law. Id. at 80. Fourth, although not firmly established, the Tribunal's actions will
further the movement for international criminality of offenses under common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention. Id. at 82. Also, the due process guarantees in the Tribunal's statute are
extended in relation to those of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters. Id. at 83. Sixth, rape is
recognized as a crime against humanity. Id. at 84. Finally, by discarding the requirement for a
nexus of the crime to the war, the definition of "crimes against humanity" has been broadened.
Thus, the prosecution of crimes related to the conflict, but not in the course of armed conflict,
will be far easier. Id. at 87.
115. Ortenlicher, supra note 53, at 2551.
116. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan.
12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. This convention explicitly
expresses the state's duty to prosecute violations of their respective treaties. Ironically, the
Genocide Convention itself offers little aid to the Rwandan genocide. The Convention ensures
punishment of the crime in national courts. Id. art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-82, but the lack of a
universal jurisdiction is particularly problematic because the Rwandans are unlikely to obtain
relief from the previous regime through the Convention's mechanism. See generally Lori L.
Brunn, Note and Comment, Beyond the 1948 Convention-Emerging Principles of Genocide in
Customary International Law, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 193 (1993) (Lack of universal
jurisdiction is the greatest problem with this convention.). Contra Ortenlicher, supra note 53, at
2565. As a matter of customary international law, there is universal jurisdiction over genocide,
although it is not specifically mentioned within the Genocide Convention itself.
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rights are violated, '7 but have been interpreted to mean that a state must
investigate and punish violations of these rights."8
In the Rwanda case, the international community was concerned
over the newly-established government's ability to fulfill its international
obligations, and granted Rwanda's request for an international tribunal.'
Before losing its sole jurisdiction, Rwanda did have the duty to prosecute
these violations. It is useful to examine the methods that other burgeoning
democracies are using to deal with the human rights violations of previous
regimes. Perhaps the Rwandan tragedy would have been better mitigated
under such a domestic option.
1. The Chilean Model
Recently Chile and several other newly democratized nations have
decided to sacrifice justice for reconciliation.'20 Since 1990, Chile has
offered blanket amnesty to the prior repressive regime while still instituting
an investigation into the crimes of that regime. ' The reasons for this
approach are basically political. Initially, seeking criminal convictions
may have caused unrest, and possibly another coup.' Furthermore, many
of those who stood to benefit from the amnesty had already been murdered
or had disappeared.'23 Therefore Chile chose to ignore its internationally
imposed obligation to prosecute the subjects of its investigation'24 and freed
itself to concentrate on reuniting the nation.
Chile's decision to breach its international duty to prosecute should
not be advocated for Rwanda. However, the more basic and practical
aspects of the Chilean model of reconstruction, with a limited degree of
117. Ortenlicher, supra note 53, at 2551. See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment,
State Responsibility To Investigate and Prosecute Grave Hwnan Rights Violations in International
Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 449, 479, 482-83 (1990) (stating that the scope of remedy required by
Human Rights violations is specifically outlined for each International Convention).
118. Id. at 2552.
119. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 2.
120. Charles Krauthanmer, Truth, Not Trials; A Way for the Newly Liberated To Deal with
the Crimes of the Past, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994, at A27.
121. Robert J. Quinn, Note, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for
the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 905,
907 (1994).
122. Krauthammer, supra note 120.
123. Quinn, supra note 121, at 918.
124. Id.
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amnesty, may be fruitful for Rwanda.2' If Rawanda follows Chile's
emphasis on investigations'26 and reparations,'" perhaps it might have had
the opportunity to reconcile while maintaining stability.'28 If Chile had not
granted a blanket amnesty, but merely punished the most severe human
rights violations, they would have been complying with their international
obligation to prosecute.'29
Admittedly, the situation in Rwanda differs from Chile. In Chile, a
single repressive regime perpetrated the human rights violations, while in
Rwanda, an entire ethnic group violated human rights during a civil war
for generations. Considering the magnitude of the Rwandan genocide, it is
unlikely that amnesty would even be considered by the Rwandan
government. However, this approach is proving successful for other
emerging African democracies like South Africa' 3 and should be
considered by the Rwandan authorities.
IV. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Punishment of the massacres, "mindless violence and carnage," 3'
and genocide of Rwanda would have been most sensible in a permanently
established International Criminal Court.' However, despite the
drawbacks of a tribunal, the United Nations has decided to prosecute
criminals through an ad hoc method."' This decision is indicative of not
only the international community's desire for a permanent court, but also
its reluctance to commit the necessary resources."
125. Id. at 960. The international community should recognize that a modification of the
Chilean model would be acceptable for other transitional governments. The Chilean model provides
stability, while satisfying those injured with lengthy investigations.
126. Id. at 954. President Aylwin created the National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation in order to fulfill the state's responsibility to acknowledge previous violations.
127. Id. at 955. Chilean Law No. 19,123 created the National Corporation for Reparation
and Reconciliation which provides medical, educational, and monetary assistance to victims and their
families.
128. Quinn, supra note 121, at 960.
129. Id.
130. Krauthammer, supra note 120.
131. Massacres, 'Mindless Violence and Carnage' Rage in Rwanda, U.N. CHRON., Sept.
1994, at 15.
132. U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 271, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993).
According to article 22 of The Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, the court
would have jurisdiction over the crimes defined in various treaties such as The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions, and the proposed
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
133. SCOR Res. 955, supra note 20, at 1.
134. Maguire, supra note 106, at 4.
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A. What Law Would Be Applied?
Undoubtedly, the need for an international criminal code and court
exists.'" A draft code of punishable crimes has been a thorn in the side of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations since
Nuremberg.' 3  The inability to reach a consensus on the definition of
aggression stalled the adoption of any code for virtually forty years.'37
Fortunately, the end of the Cold War not only thawed East-West co-
operation, but also revived the criminal code debate. In 1987, President
Gorbachev's Perestroika policy included recognition of the jurisdiction of
international courts and was a major impetus for the drafting of a new
criminal code.'38 It was this new political climate, coupled with Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which propelled the need for a criminal code
and court to the forefront of international criminal law.'39
135. Nagan, supra note 33, at 24. The sudden surge to create a permanent court has also
been attributed to administrative and bureaucratic causes. The International Law Commission has
been forced to seek extra resources from the United Nations budget in order to fulfill the
investigatory duties with which it was charged in the former yugoslavia. Id. Thus, there has
been a strong pressure from within the United Nations bureaucracy to create a separate tribunal
with its own prosecutorial and investigatory capabilities, in the hopes of relieving the burden on
the International Law Commission. Id.
136. Lieutenant Commander Rolph, Perfecting an International Code of Crimes, ARMY
LAW, June 1992, 42, 47.
137. Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand
and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 378 (1992).
138. Id. at 379.
139. Louis R. Beres, After the Gulf War: Iraq, Genocide and International Law, 69 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 13, 14 (1991). The U.N. Security Council repeatedly condemned the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, without a code or court to punish Iraqi aggressions, crimes
were "carried out with essential impunity." Id. at 13. These crimes should have been addressed
by international law, but politics have interfered with any real punishment. Id. at 14. See
Kleinberger, supra note 10, at 72. Kleinberger effectively uses Iraq's behavior during the
Persian Gulf War as evidence of the need for an international criminal court. Nevertheless, even
if an adjudicative response had materialized, the lack of available adjudicative mechanisms would
render such a response useless. Id. First, the doctrines upon which international criminal law
exists are vague and generalized. Id. at 86. Neither the Nuremberg Charter, nor the U.N.
charter, nor the Geneva Conventions have successfully defined the war crimes or provided a legal
basis for punishment. Id. at 87. Although Iraq would have few viable defenses in the light of
the tremendous atrocities which violated portions of all of these statutes, the lack of one cohesive
code would make adjudication very difficult. Id. at 106. Under each statute, only a few of the
atrocities would be crimes.
Second, the lack of a suitable forum for hearing this case is indicative of the need for a
Court. Id. at 103. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over disputes between
states to enforce international conventions, customs, and recognized principles of law. Id. at
104. However, municipal courts in Kuwait or the United States could have provided a viable
forum. Id. at 103. Even an ad hoc tribunal could have tried crimes of particular individuals. Id.
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The most recent and inclusive attempt at developing an
international code of crimes was made by the International Law
Commission in 1991.' The "Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind" 4 was particularly noteworthy for categorizing
colonialism, apartheid, serious injury to the environment, terrorism, and
drug trafficking as crimes. 42 This draft successfully highlighted the
problems which needed to be addressed before any code could be
adopted.' 3 However, its imperfections were too large to withstand
scrutiny,'" and it has not been brought to a vote.
First, the Draft Code failed to specify punishments for the crimes
it listed.' 5 Also, many of the provisions were vague. '"6 The terminology
was ambiguously defined by attempting to create a consensus from
wording which was extracted from previous international conventions.'
Such terminology did not achieve the specificity and legal precision
required by a penal code for the fair distribution of justice."' Often there
But without a single court enforcing a single code, adjudication would only be as binding as Iraq
would allow it to be.
Kleinberger theorizes that it is the fundamental hiearchical differences between international
and criminal law which prevents the development of an international criminal court when the
need for their merger is so apparent. Id. at 104. Criminal law relies on a vertical power
structure where the enforcer of law is superior to the violator of law. Id. at 105. However,
international law is based on a horizontal power structure whereby all nations are equal and
accession to the law is virtually voluntary. Id. at 104. International criminal law will be
virtually stagnant until the two systems can be reconciled.
140. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 238-344, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
141. The original draft code was presented to the General Assembly in 1954 as The Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 9 U.S. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11,
U.N. Doc. A.2693 (1954). It has yet to be adopted.
142. Ferencz, supra note 137, at 381. See generally William N. Gianaris, The New World
Order and the Need for an International Criminal Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88 (1992)
(explaining that the increasing scope and diversity of international crime created the need for an
international criminalm court as no other time in history). I
143. Rolph, supra note 136, at 47.
144. Ferencz, supra note 137, at 381.
145. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 205-06, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991). The drafters were
unable to reach a conclusion as to which kind of penal system to institute: one group sought to
establish separate penalties depending on the crime; the other group desired a single penalty, with
a minimum and maximum sentence depending on the circumstances of each case. The death
penalty and life imprisonment were also hotly debated by the Commission. Id. at 206. Many
members argued from the position that the death penalty was immoral and unnecessary, while
nations who used the death penalty, lobbied for its establishment. Id. at 208-09.
146. Ferencz, supra note 137, at 381.
147. Id.
148. Id. See, e.g,. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: The Need for a
Specialized Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 486-87 (1994). Professor Bassiouni
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was no adequate description of the legal elements which constitute a
particular crime.' 9 The delegates of the various nations were quick to
point out the failures of the Draft. 50 Unable to produce a penal code to
satisfy all nations, the Draft Code remains in limbo. 5'
The current stalemate of the Draft Code has directly affected the
development of the International Criminal Court.'52 The United Nations'
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction has deferred action on
the International Criminal Court until an agreement is reached as to the
code of crimes.' 3 Thus, the need for a criminal code is self-evident: until
a code is adopted, the Court will never be established.
B. The Future of the Court
If the International Criminal Court is to be created, now is the
time. First, there is a positive aura of cooperation as evidenced by the ad
hoc tribunals, and the Security Council's resohite intent to end conflicts in
various areas of the world." Second, nations' increasing fears of drug
trafficking and terrorism in the modern world have increased interest in an
international court.'55 Third, nations are becoming weary of expending
lives and money on other nations' conflicts. Using military force against
other nations in order to enforce international law is becoming
burdensome.'56
outlines several particular problems with the portion of the draft which deals with crimes against
humanity. First, there are fewer crimes listed as crimes against humanity than in the Nuremberg
Charter. Id. Furthermore, many crimes which are carried over from Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter do not correspond to the definitions of the crimes in the Draft. Id. at 457. In his legal
expertise, Professor Bassiouni fails to see the nexus between some of the newly-listed crimes to the
original crimes against humanity. Id. at 486-87.
149. Id.
150. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 46th Sess., 29th-37th mtgs., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.29-37
(1991).
151. The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind was debated again
in 1993. After the member nations had a chance to review the Draft Code, its main failures were
analyzed and various portions of the original were changed. See Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 21-
25, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993).
152. Ferencz, supra note 137, at 385.
153. Id.
154. Jose A. Baez, An International Crimes Court: Further Tales of the King of Corinth, 23
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289, 291 (1993).
155. Cavicchia, supra note 102, at 231.
156. Michael D. Greenberg, Creating an International Criminal Court, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J.
119, 141 (1992).
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Despite the lack of a recognized code of crimes, or a court, many
scholars have kept the goal of an International Criminal Court alive.' 7
Some of these scholars have proposed permanent methods of adjudication
which, had they been created, would have provided very viable
alternatives for trying the instigators of the Rwandan genocide.'"8
1. The Current Draft
Today, in 1994, the International Law Commission (ILC) of the
United Nations remains hopeful that the current draft presented to the
United Nations General Assembly will be adopted.'59 The most recent
proposal has been created in accordance with several principles. First, the
Court would be established by statute to which the states would sign in the
form of a treaty."w The Court would exercise jurisdiction over private
persons, not states. 6 ' Also, the Court's jurisdiction would not be limited
to the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, but
would extend over specified international treaties.'62 Additionally, the
157. M. Cherif Bassiouni has been a recognized authority on international criminal law, and a
proponent of an International Criminal Court for decades. At the request of the United Nations, M.
Cherif Bassiouni prepared the draft statute of an international criminal jurisdiction to implement the
Apartheid Convention in 1980. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for
an International Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L.
L. 151, 158 (1992). The plan was submitted but lay dormant until 1990, when a revision of
Bassiouni's draft was sent to the United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of
Offenders.
158. Because the Rwandan crimes are being tried as violations of human rights, the laws of
war are beyond the scope of this article. However it is interesting to note the possibility of a war
crimes tribunal in an American military forum. In particular, it has been suggested that an American
court-martial or military commission would provide a stable forum for adjudication of international
violations of the laws of war. See Robinson 0. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forums for Punishing
Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 510 (1994). Proponents of
this approach argue that there is sufficient precedent in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to
support this method. Id. at 511. According to article I, section 8, clause 10 of the United States
Constitution, Congress has the power to punish offenses against the law of nations. Id. at 512. This
clause does not specify nationalities. By stretching this constitutional clause to include offenders of
other nations, Congress may be able to punish foreign nationals who violate the recognized law of
nations both against the United States and third parties. Id. at 514. Whether the United States
would want to take on this obligation and increase its perception as the "watchdog of the world" is
another question. Nevertheless, this is a seemingly viable option to consider.
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AM. J. INT'L L. 134 (1994). The previous draft has been revised and is being prepared for
examination by the General Assembly.
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Court would basically have consensual, rather than compulsory,
jurisdiction.'63 Finally, the Court would stand only when required.,"
2. Refutable Objections to the International Criminal Court
The objections to the International Criminal Court are easily
refuted. Undoubtedly the main reason that the International Criminal
Court does not exist is because nations fear losing their sovereignty. 65
States are concerned that either their citizens will not be awarded fair
adjudication, or alternatively, that they will not receive just compensation
in a foreign court.'" However, nations must fulfill their international
obligation of obedience to international law that transcends national
duties.67 Initial concerns of sovereignty must be suppressed in order to
create the International Criminal Court which will enforce human rights
and other international duties.'"
A second major objection to the International Criminal Court is
that nations foresee conflicts between their domestic courts and the
international court. ' Admittedly, concurrent jurisdiction may cause bitter
conflicts.'70 No system is perfect, but the expected positive results of the
International Criminal Court, such as improved extradition and
prosecution, will greatly outweigh those instances of inconvenience when
those conflicts occur. '7'
Some critics cite the dangers in disrupting the existing system as
the reason to postpone creating the Court." They claim that needed
resources may be diverted from the more mundane concerns such as
efforts to combat crime.' However, if the Court is standing only when
problems arise, there would be virtually no cost between sessions.7 The
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method of mutual assistance would be no more costly than the mutual
assistance currently employed by the United Nations."
3. Conclusion
The obstacles posed by critics of the International Criminal Court,
if not easily overcome, are certainly manageable. Had the International
Criminal Court been established, Rwanda's adjudication may have had a
higher likelihood for success. A permanent court would have had the
stability which the ad hoc tribunal lacks. 76 Secondly, the administrative
problems which plague the ad hoc tribunal would have been minimized by
the Court's growth and success.'" Finally, a permanent tribunal would not
be involved in the political questions surrounding the peace process.
Therefore, justice would not be sacrificed in the interest of reaching a
settlement.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent tragedy in Rwanda is only one example of many human
rights violations throughout the world. Unfortunately, there is no
permanent forum for adjudication of these crimes. Therefore, the
international community has responded arbitrarily to some of these
situations with ad hoc tribunals. Yet it seems inherently unfair for some of
these violations to be singled out for punishment while others are not.
Furthermore, the current Tribunal imposed upon Rwanda has
several short-comings. These short-comings will have an effect not only
upon the outcome of the Rwandan adjudication, but upon the future of
international criminal law. For this reason it is becoming increasingly
imperative for the United Nations General Assembly to create an
International Criminal Court. A permanently established international
tribunal with a clarified code of crimes is needed to handle the human
rights violations throughout the world. The exaggerated fears and apathy
of many nations have prevented the adoption of this permanent tribunal.
Consequently, they have prohibited Rwanda, and other nations with
similar human rights problems, from having the fair adjudication which
they deserve. In 1995, the Nuremberg Trials will celebrate their 50th
anniversary. This is the appropriate time to re-evaluate the ideals of
Nuremberg and expand upon them with a permanent Tribunal.
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